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Abstract: Neo-classical economics assumes rational behaviour of economic subjects. 
The aim of policy makers is to maximise a broadly defined concept of social 
welfare, which may include some measure of environmental quality. In this 
view government intervention is needed when, due to externalities or other 
reasons for market failure, individual optimising behaviour does not lead to a 
socially optimal outcome. Therefore, neo-classical economics provides useful 
insights about the reasons behind technology lock-ins, and whether 
technological transitions are needed to escape from such lock-ins in order to 
enhance social welfare in the long run. This paper gives, from the neo-classical 
perspective, a survey of the state of the art of economic thinking on lock-ins, 
technological change and the possible role of the government to correct market 
failures by promoting technological transitions. 
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To some extent, environmental policy has been effective in the last 
decades. Environmental problems have been solved and pollution has 
decreased in a number of cases where the problems had a local scale and 
where the consequences of the pollution could be observed directly by the 
stakeholders. The OECD (2001) has labelled as ‘green’ problems that relate 
to traditional forms of industrial pollution, such as air and water pollution. 
Yet a new generation of problems that remain unsolved may have a much 
more fundamental impact on society than relatively simple ‘green’ problems. 
These are the ‘wicked’ environmental problems that are labelled ‘red’ by the 
OECD. A characteristic of these problems is that their consequences are not 
directly observable; due to large international externalities, they require 
policy co-ordination on a worldwide scale (see also WRR, 2003). The major 
example is the emission of greenhouse gases and the resulting global 
warming. Other examples are the loss of biodiversity and the possible 
negative consequences of the adoption of certain forms of biotechnology. 
Amongst environmental experts there is a general consensus that major 
changes in the preferences and behaviour of consumers and producers are 
necessary to solve these wicked environmental problems, bringing about a 
need for system innovations, or so-called industrial transformation.  
Industrial transformation research seeks to understand complex society-
environment interactions, identify driving forces for change, and explore 
development trajectories with a significantly lesser burden on the 
environment. Industrial transformation research is of an integrative and 
multidisciplinary character, and focuses on systems and systems change. It is 
based on the assumption that important changes in production and 
consumption systems will be required in order to meet the needs and 
aspirations of a growing world population while using environmental 
resources in a sustainable manner (see Vellinga and Herb, 1999 and Chapter 
by Geels in this book). ‘Transition’ or ‘transition management’ describes 
how such systems change can take place. 
It is obvious that major changes in production and consumption systems 
will never take place unless they are accompanied by, and even driven by, 
technological changes. That is why the Dutch government emphasises, in its 
recent national environmental policy plan (Nationaal Milieubeleidsplan IV 
(NMP4), 2001), that technological transitions are required in order to arrive 
at a situation of sustainable development. From the perspective of 
government intervention, much attention is given in the plan to the 
possibility of managing transitions towards sustainability. 
The national environmental policy plan (NMP4, 2001: section 4.5) uses  
a very broad concept of transition. It is seen as a long-term societal 
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transformation process, which includes technological, other economic, 
social, cultural and institutional changes. These changes in the various fields 
of society interact and strengthen each other. During such periods of 
transition, policy goals should be formulated and adapted, and policy 
instruments are to be used in a co-ordinated manner. Transition 
management plays, in this view, a major role in the planning and co-
ordination of the transition process. The national environmental plan 
thereby describes transition management as a very broad concept too. It 
requires as key elements process-oriented steering characterised by 
uncertainty, complexity and interdependence. There is, according to the plan, 
an explicit role for the government, which should co-ordinate, stimulate, 
facilitate, steer and maintain.  
This article considers technological transitions and the possible role of 
the government in steering these transitions from the neo-classical economic 
perspective, and will focus its analysis by using a narrower and more precise 
concept of transition and transition management. The neo-classical 
perspective confines the definition of transition to a technological transition 
where an old and less productive technology is gradually replaced by a new, 
more productive technology. Consequently, transition management 
describes how the government can facilitate such a technological transition. 
The neo-classical perspective does not consider the interdependence among 
the technological transition and the cultural and social transitions, in the case 
of a fundamental system innovation; nor does it provide policy prescriptions 
on how the government should co-ordinate these interdependent transitions; 
but it does provide government with insights on options to correct market 
failures. Moreover, in the neo-classical framework preferences are 
considered as given, so that it does not endogenise the room for the 
government to interfere in the process of preference formation. However, the 
neo-classical look at technological transitions is related to the features of 
industrial transformation in taking into account the dynamic interactions and 
mutual interdependencies among the (socio-) economic, the technological 
and the environmental variables.  
As a matter of fact, neo-classical economics has a long-standing tradition 
of describing and analysing processes of technical change and the possible 
role of government intervention. The leading principle is that economic 
subjects behave rationally given their preferences. The next section of this 
article briefly reviews the foundations of neo-classical economics and 
welfare theory. It also shows how the environment has been given a proper 
place in this theoretical perspective. In Section 3 we focus on how technical 
change is analysed within the neo-classical framework. Section 4 describes 
why technological lock-ins may occur. The underlying reasons for 




promoting a transition. The need for transitions and the scope for 
government intervention to facilitate transitions are discussed in Section 5. 
Section 6 takes the example of wind energy to illustrate the role of niches in 
an early transition process. Finally, Section 7 draws some conclusions.  
2. NEO-CLASSICAL ECONOMICS 
AND THE ENVIRONMENT 
Economics studies the production and consumption of commodities, i.e. 
goods and services. In particular, economics is concerned with the efficient 
use of scarce resources in production and consumption. A resource is called 
scarce if it is not unlimited (and freely) available. A consequence of this 
limited availability is that an allocation decision has to be made as to what 
end casu quo for the production or consumption of what good the scarce 
resource will be used. These decisions are taken by the economic actors, i.e. 
the government and private actors (producers and consumers) in so-called 
markets. One of the basic starting points of neo-classical economics is that 
economic agents behave rationally; consumers allocate their budgets in 
accordance with their preferences such that their utility is maximised, while 
producers allocate their resources in the production process such that profits 
are maximised.  
Within the neo-classical economics school of thought one of the fields of 
research is welfare economics. Welfare economics focuses on the issue of 
the well-being of society. Pareto, who defined the concept of Pareto 
Efficiency, established the foundations of welfare economics. An allocation 
is called Pareto Efficient if no person can be made better off without making 
at least one other person worse off. It can be shown that in an economy 
where all markets are complete and competitive, the resulting allocation, 
which is based on individual decisions, will be welfare maximising and 
Pareto efficient. In such an economy there is no need for government 
intervention. 
In the real world, however, several forms of market failures exist which 
give rise to inefficient allocations and thus may give cause for government 
intervention. In the following we will examine four forms of market failures: 
external effects, absence of property rights, public goods and the difference 
between private discount rates and social discount rates. Economists talk 
about an external effect if an allocation decision has an effect (i.e. a cost or a 
benefit) that is external to the agent who is causing the effect by his or her 
decision. In other words, the decision of one agent can affect the welfare of 
other agents in the economy, and this effect is not compensated for in 
the market. One of the underlying causes of an external effect can be the 
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absence of property rights, as a result of which there is no market for the 
goods at stake.  
Another form of market failure arises in the presence of public goods. A 
public good is a good that is non-rival (consumption by one person does not 
affect the amount available for others) and non-exclusive (nobody can be 
excluded from consuming the good). Well-known examples of public goods 
are defence, jurisdiction and environmental quality. As nobody can be 
excluded from consuming the good, nobody can be forced to pay for the use 
of the good, and the so-called ‘free rider’ problem arises, resulting in a sub-
optimal allocation. Finally, a difference between the private discount rate 
and the social discount rate can result in inefficient market decisions. The 
discount rate, a concept that is used to compare the value of future money 
with current money, is built out of two components: time preference and a 
risk premium. Time preference refers to the fact that we prefer to have 
something today over having the same thing tomorrow. Besides pure time 
preference, there is another reason why having an amount of money today is 
preferable to having the same amount of money tomorrow. There is always 
the risk of losses on future amounts of money due to inflation or to setbacks 
in future yields. As the risk depends on the investment for which the money 
is used, it is obvious that there can be a difference between the social and the 
private risk premium, resulting in a difference between social and private 
discount rates. This difference can lead to inefficient market decisions. 
The natural environment is a notable example of the existence of market 
failures, since the use of the environment in consumption and production 
involves external effects and/or property rights that are not (well) defined. 
Environmental economics focuses on the role of the natural environment in 
the economic process as well as on the effects of the economic process on 
the natural environment. Given the above-described characteristic of the 
natural environment in terms of a scarce resource whose allocation gives rise 
to market failures, conceptually the environment fits in a natural way within 
the neo-classical economic framework. At the same time, however, it is 
difficult to actually include the natural environment in the neo-classical 
economic framework sketched above from an operational point of view, as 
the natural environment has so many dimensions, both in space and in time. 
At least five different economic aspects of the natural environment should be 
distinguished: 
– Environmental quality as a production factor; i.e. the non-extractive use 
of the environment in production; 
– Environmental services as a production factor; i.e. the extractive use of 




– Environmental quality as an (additional) indicator of economic welfare, 
which implies inclusion of environmental quality as an argument in the 
welfare function; 
– The influence of abatement activities on environmental quality; 
– The regenerative capacities of the environment. 
So, the environment plays a role both in consumption (welfare) and 
production. With respect to welfare, only the stock of the environment plays 
a role, while with respect to production a distinction can be made between 
flows and stocks in the specification of the environment as a factor of 
production. Welfare derived from environmental services is not explicitly 
mentioned, as this aspect is implicit in production in the case of extractive 
use (e.g. water consumption or recreational services that lead to a 
degradation of the environment); and in the case of non-extractive use 
(recreational services that do not lead to a degradation of the environment) it 
is implicit in the environmental quality indicator in the welfare function. 
Note that extractive use of the environment in production that has negative 
effects on welfare ― think, for example, of smoke or noise ― forms part of 
the welfare function through the environmental quality indicator (which falls 
as a consequence of extractive use in production). Furthermore, abatement 
activities can be regarded as investment in environmental capital because 
they may improve the state of environment. Finally, self-regenerative 
capacities can (partly) offset the deterioration of the environment due to the 
use of environmental resources. 
Taking the above-described economic aspects of the natural environment 
into account, the natural environment can be given a proper and natural place 
within the neo-classical economics framework. The starting point of the neo-
classical framework is that the market mechanism can, under specific 
conditions, lead to an allocation that maximises social welfare. However, in 
reality, economic activity can have undesired effects on the natural 
environment due to the existence of market failures. This, however, does not 
imply that markets are not suitable as a means to allocate resources in a 
socially most desirable way. Rather, it implies that the shortcomings of 
markets have to be taken into account, and that the conditions under which 
markets operate should be improved or that new markets have to be created. 
In the context of market failures that have to do with environmental issues, a 
whole range of policy instruments is available, ranging from taxes, subsidies 
and tradable permits to direct regulation and voluntary agreements. 
To this point, we have presented the concept of efficiency as the leading 
principle in the framework of thinking of neo-classical economists. In  
the context of environmental issues, the concept of sustainability or 
sustainable development is central. According to the Brundlandt report 
(World Commission on Environment and Development, 1987), ‘Sustainable 
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Development is development that meets the needs of the present without 
compromising the ability of future generations to meet their own needs.’ 
Sustainability, which raises questions about the welfare of future 
generations, can in fact be viewed as a long-term variant of efficiency. In 
order to be able to analyse the conditions under which sustainable 
development is possible all the (dynamic) interactions between the 
environment and the economy as described above have to be taken into 
account. Thus, dynamic specifications of all the relationships involved 
should be assessed. In studying the long-term relationship between economy 
and ecology, technology and the development of new technologies play a 
crucial role. Within neo-classical economics, the analysis of technological 
change is studied within the field of growth theory. In the next section we 
will give an overview of this field of research. 
3. TECHNOLOGICAL CHANGE 
In neo-classical economics, the analysis of technical change is part of 
growth theory. Growth theory tries to explain structural developments in the 
economy, i.e. long run developments in the production structure given  
the preferences and, therefore, is complementary to cyclical analysis. The 
production function has a key role in models of economic growth. This 
function describes the production process as a transformation of the 
production factors as inputs to final production as output. The simple 
traditional models of economic growth have two production factors as 
inputs, namely labour and capital. However, in growth models that consider 
environmental issues as well, a third production factor is included, namely 
energy, which is usually considered as a practical representation of the 
broader concept of (the use of) environmental capital. 
A production function describes a specific production technology. An 
increase in one of the production factors may, given the production 
technology, lead to more output. Hence, economic growth can be the result 
of an increase in input of production factors. However, for the analysis of 
technological change it is more relevant to consider the consequences  
of technical progress as a driving force for economic growth. An 
improvement in production technology will result in a higher output given 
the various factor inputs. The reason for such higher production may be an 
increase in the efficiency of the use of one of these inputs. For instance, given 
the other factor inputs, when less labour is needed to produce the same amount 
of output, apparently there has been an increase in the efficiency of the use of 
labour in the production process, which results in higher labour productivity 




is called a labour augmenting technical progress. Similarly, we may have 
capital-augmenting and/or energy-augmenting technical progress. Yet quite 
often it occurs that we are unable to ascribe the increase in the efficiency of 
production to one of the production factors. In that case, we have an increase 
in total factor productivity (TFP).  
Traditional neo-classical models of economic growth do not explain why 
technical progress occurs. Technical progress is exogenous and, as said by 
Joan Robinson, given to us as ‘manna from heaven by God and the 
engineers’. Yet, more sophisticated empirical models of the production 
process make technical progress endogenous by describing it as the result of 
investments in research and development (R&D), and, in the case of labour 
augmenting technical progress, as the result of an increase in human capital 
through learning. These models allow us to analyse the consequences of 
relative price changes for the production technology and for technical 
progress. For instance, when the relative price of energy increases as 
compared to the price of labour, we will see, due to the substitution effect, a 
decrease in the use of energy and an increase in the use of labour in the 
production process. It implies an increase in energy productivity and a 
decrease in labour productivity. Yet, as a secondary effect, more resources in 
research and development may be devoted to enhancing energy efficiency  
in production and less to the development of new labour saving technology. 
In other words, the relative price change, which may be an autonomous 
change but can also be the deliberate consequence of a green tax policy, 
induces a change in the bias of technical progress: technical progress 
becomes more energy-augmenting and less labour-augmenting (see e.g. Den 
Butter and Hofkes, 2001). 
Like all models in economics, the production function is a metaphor and 
a very stylised representation of reality. Extending economic growth models to 
mimic reality more closely is needed to account for the fact that techniques are 
incorporated in existing capital goods. The capital goods that are installed 
some years ago will use an older (and less efficient) technology than new 
investments that can be added to the capital stock today. It is, however, 
necessary to use capital goods in the production process for a 
considerable period of time in order to earn back the investment costs. So 
one cannot always install the most modern and efficient capital goods and 
scrap all other ones. That is why in practice it is impossible to adapt the 
production method immediately to a change in factor prices. This way of 
modelling production is called ‘the vintage approach’ because a row of 
consecutive investments in capital goods is distinguished as separate 
vintages that build up the capital stock. In the course of time, on the one 
hand, investments are added as new vintages to the capital stock, whereas 
on the other hand, old vintages are scrapped when they become unproductive 
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and when investment costs are earned back. In their assumed rational 
investment behaviour, entrepreneurs reckon with all future relative price 
changes and are supposed to be able to calculate the time period a vintage 
has to remain installed in order to earn back the investments’ costs. 
Uncertainty and learning behaviour may complicate this calculation, 
however. 
Especially at the level of the plant or industry, vintage models provide a 
more elaborate representation of technological change and the adoption of 
new techniques than simple production functions do. Yet, new vintages 
of capital goods cannot be installed solely because more efficient techniques 
have become available or because changes have occurred in relative prices 
of production factors. Apart from an informational deficiency on the part of 
the producer, the phenomenon of ‘time to build,’ or to restructure, may be a 
reason why, in the case of so called win-win situations, where implementing 
new techniques can be both more environment-saving and more labour-
saving than existing techniques ― such new technology is not always 
immediately installed. So, neo-classical vintage models can explain why it 
can be rational that win-win situations are not (immediately) exploited by the 
industry. Moreover, it takes time (and money) to instruct personnel and let 
them become familiar with the working of a new technology. As we will 
discuss later, these learning processes play an important role in the path 
dependency of the implementation of technological innovations and are an 
important reason for lock-ins of existing techniques. 
Indirectly and in due time, however, a change in relative prices will 
indeed lead to a change in the structure of production where the bias of 
technical progress is directed towards production factors which have become 
relatively more expensive. For instance, when the increase in the costs of 
energy exceeds the rise in wage costs, e.g. as a result of policy measures, 
entrepreneurs will select those new production techniques from the range of 
possible techniques that yield the highest energy efficiency. Moreover, when 
selecting which of the old capital goods are to be scrapped, the energy 
efficiency of the production process will have a greater weight in the 
decision than labour intensity.  
Obviously, only calculations that use empirical models can show whether 
labour and energy savings were caused by a particular policy or by 
autonomous variations in factor prices. Moreover, these empirical models 
can also be used to calculate various scenarios for technological transitions. 
In such cases, policy measures (e.g. shifts of taxes from labour to energy) 
can be implemented by means of exogenous changes in the prices of energy 
and labour in the model. Yet alternative scenarios for transitions can also  
be obtained by a sensitivity analysis on the estimated or calibrated parameter 




institutional changes (e.g. the introduction of a system of tradable emission 
rights) or of changes in preferences (e.g. a greater weighting being given to 
environmental quality).  
Another (and more common) interpretation of sensitivity analysis is that 
it provides insight into the possible range of future developments given the 
uncertainty about the parameter values that are used in the model’s baseline 
projection. It should be noted that scenarios based on empirical models differ 
considerably from the socio-technical scenarios for transitions (see e.g. 
Geels, 2002) that are of a narrative and much broader nature. 
What implications do the mechanisms described in the vintage models of 
economic growth have for environmental policy that aims to reduce energy 
use or, more broadly, for policy designed to reduce the use of environmental 
capital, which has to be directed at an increase in energy productivity? Given 
the available funds for research and development, so that the same amount is 
invested in the development of new technologies, and, roughly speaking, 
total factor productivity remains the same, such policy may lead to a relative 
decrease in labour productivity and/or capital productivity in comparison 
with the scenario without environmental policy. These changes in 
productivity will also lead to changes in product prices. This implies that 
environmentally intensive, ‘dirty’ products will become more expensive 
relative to ‘clean’ products, which use less environment in their production 
processes. This is because, in general, the possibilities for substitution in the 
production process will be too small to fully compensate the changes in 
factor prices.  
Hence, in general, the products of sectors of industry with ‘dirty’ 
production methods will become more expensive in comparison to products 
from sectors that use clean technology. So, to some extent, the aim of the 
policy, namely a decrease in the use of the environment as a production 
factor compared to current trends, will be reached by means of a relative 
shrinking of the ‘dirty’ sectors and a relative growth of the clean sectors. 
This can be seen as a consequence of a general policy directed at 
internalising the negative externalities of environmental use in production. 
Therefore, in order to achieve a shift in the sectoral structure of production 
that leads to less damage to the environment, there is no need for (domestic) 
environmental policy to take specific measures with respect to ‘dirty’ sectors 
of industry. 
The description above relates to the influence of environmental policy on 
technological change. From the neo-classical perspective, the reason for 
conducting environmental policy, in this case by changing the relative prices 
of factor inputs, is that the production using energy (or the environment 
more generally) as an input brings about negative externalities. These 
negative externalities imply a market failure, which the government has to 
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correct in order to enhance social welfare. In this case, we assume a broad 
concept of social welfare with environmental quality as one of its elements 
(see also Den Butter and Hofkes, 1995). The policy prescription is to 
internalise the externality so that the users pay a socially optimal price for 
the use of energy (or the environment). 
On the other hand, modern neo-classical theory of economic growth 
explains that, in the case of the development of new techniques and in the 
adoption of new techniques in production, positive externalities may occur. 
These externalities are the main reason why governments should introduce 
technology policy in order to enhance social welfare. In this case, market 
failures relate to the fact that the revenues of investment in R&D will almost 
never completely accrue to those who have financed the research. Research, 
and the implementation and adoption of technical innovations, almost 
always bring about positive spill-over effects to others, who may in turn use 
the experience in further research (‘standing on shoulders’) or in their own 
production process (taking advantage of others’ learning). Technological 
knowledge has, in part, the character of a non-rival, public good. This is 
why, when investment decisions are completely left to the market, it 
generally results in underinvestment in R&D. It is true that the government 
may, by means of patents and so on, give complete property rights of the 
technology knowledge to those who have invested in the new knowledge. 
Yet, from the perspective of social welfare, such a situation is not optimal 
because in that case others cannot apply that knowledge and use it to further 
develop the technology. This is why technology policy aims to avoid under-
investment in technological knowledge and tries to promote the use and 
diffusion of this knowledge. So we see that, from the neo-classical 
perspective, a good analysis of these types of market failure is essential for 
sound economic policy. This applies to how both environmental policy and 
technology policy affect technological change. 
The neo-classical growth models described above are characterised by a 
production function with diminishing returns to the accumulation of capital, 
and constant returns in labour and reproducible capital together. In such a 
model, only continued technological progress can sustain a positive growth 
rate of output in the long run. Without technological progress the effects of 
diminishing returns eventually cause economic growth to cease, and the only 
feasible steady-state rate of growth that can result is a zero rate. New growth 
theorists have tackled this unsatisfactory property of neo-classical growth theory 
by endogenising the long-run rate of economic growth. 
Endogenous growth can be modelled in different ways. In the late 
‘eighties, the first endogenous growth models appeared (Lucas, 1988; 
Rebelo, 1991; Romer, 1986). In Rebelo’s so-called AK-model (Rebelo, 




reproducible factors. In this model growth is unintentional but arises as a 
side product of investment. Romer (1986) extends the neo-classical growth 
theory by accounting for production externalities. These production 
externalities are a consequence of knowledge spillovers in the process of 
human capital accumulation arising from learning by doing. In the Lucas-
model (Lucas, 1988) growth arises from intentional investment in human 
capital. In this model, workers have to decide how much of their time they 
want to spend on producing goods and how much they use for learning 
activities. By learning, workers invest in their human capital, which leads to 
higher real wages. 
These new developments in growth theory have also contributed to the 
interest in integrating the environment in economic models. In the early 
‘nineties, the first endogenous growth models in which the environment 
plays a role appeared. Gradus and Smulders (1993) analyse two endogenous 
growth models that incorporate the environment. Their first model is an 
extension of the AK-model, and their second model builds on Lucas (1988). 
Bovenberg and Smulders (1995) take a step further and develop a growth 
model with endogenous pollution-saving technology, which takes the form 
of knowledge of an efficient use of renewable resources. Hofkes (1996) 
builds on the Bovenberg and Smulders model and develops a two-sector 
growth model that also allows for abatement activities. Yet these models of 
endogenous growth do not provide much information on technological 
transitions and their underlying causes. 
4. TECHNOLOGICAL LOCK-INS 
The new growth theory that was developed in the 1990s studied the issue 
of sustainability, i.e. the question of whether sustained economic growth is 
compatible with conservation of the environment. The conclusion emerged 
that maintaining environmental quality and economic growth can go together 
if a steady flow of technological innovations increases the efficiency of 
resource use (Aghion and Howitt, 1998). Yet these new or endogenous 
growth models, as we discussed in Section 3, do not make a distinction 
between clean and dirty production technologies. If one wants to study 
technological transitions from dirty to clean technologies, attention has to be 
paid to technological diversity. 
The focus on technological diversity is one of the major elements in 
evolutionary models. Evolutionary models typically describe a diverse set of 
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technologies,21 a diversification mechanism broadening the set, such as the 
arrival of random innovations, and a selection mechanism for the 
reproduction of specific technologies. The continuous diversification and 
selection mechanisms cause a drift (see also Chapter by van den Bergh in 
this book) in the characteristics of the current technology set. Those 
technologies that are most successful given the economic environment, the 
institutions, and policy regulations, are the ‘fittest’ and will then be 
reproduced. Within the context of evolutionary models, technological 
regimes, technological transitions, and technological lock-ins play a central 
role (see e.g. Dosi, 1982; Nelson and Winter, 1982; Arthur, 1989). 
Following Street and Miles (1996), a technological regime refers to ‘the 
whole complex of scientific knowledge, engineering practices, process 
technologies, infrastructure, product characteristics, skills and procedures 
which make up the totality of a technology.’ (Street and Miles, 1996: 413). 
The concept of technological regimes can also be applied in the 
framework of the new growth theory. In the context of this framework, we 
will use the term ‘technology clusters’ instead of ‘technological regimes’ to 
indicate that the analysis in the framework of (new) growth theory takes 
place at a more abstract, less detailed, level. In neo-classical economic terms, 
the process of technology selection is characterised by increasing returns to 
scale and path-dependence. Typically, technology clusters, such as the 
fossil-fuel energy system, have their own infrastructure, and this leads to a 
specialisation in the following way: Innovations that improve on dominant 
technologies, which are technologies with a substantial market share, 
generate substantial profit flows, and thereby, these innovations are very 
valuable to the owners of the innovations, the innovators. This mechanism 
generates a continuous flow of innovations, which is essential to maintain 
high productivity levels, low production costs, and substantial market shares.  
On the other hand, innovations in technologies with minor market shares 
are less valuable, and thus the incentive to improve on the technology is less 
powerful so the minor technology maintains a low productivity level, high 
costs, and a minor market share. In short, the positive feedback from market 
shares to innovations, to productivity, to market shares, strengthens the position 
of existing dominant technology clusters, and cuts the competitiveness of 
alternative, new technologies. This phenomenon is known as increasing returns 
to scale, and it leads to path dependence. The economy will specialise in 
technologies typical of the dominant cluster. This phenomenon of 
specialisation can in the end lead to a situation of lock-in. 
 
21 This technological variety may be embodied in firms, sectors or countries. For example, in 
(Nelson and Winter, 1982), the set consists of firms that possess different capabilities, 
procedures, and decision rules. 
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Increasing returns can be classified into three broad types: network 
externalities, learning effects, and economies of scale. Network externalities 
refer to the fact that the existence of networks (interrelations) between 
technologies, infrastructure and users of technologies can give rise to 
positive externalities, as the networks become more valuable as they grow 
larger. An example is telephone networks that become more valuable the 
more subscribers they have, since more people can be reached through them. 
Learning effects occur if, as a consequence of knowledge accumulation, the 
costs of using a technology decrease (and/or the performance of a technology 
improves). Finally, economies of scale can arise if, as a consequence of high 
fixed costs, the costs per unit decrease if production increases. In all cases, a 
mechanism may come into force where increasing returns lead to 
specialisation, and eventually to a situation of lock-in.  
Gerlagh and Hofkes (2002) show that in an economy which takes into 
account environmental quality and where spillovers occur, three different 
types of externalities may exist: an investment externality, a ‘choice-of-
technology’ externality and an environmental externality. Investment 
externalities result from the existence of spillovers between firms (See 
Section 3). This leads to the investment externality situation where 
investments fall short of the social optimum, which is in fact equivalent to 
the network externalities discussed above. The ‘choice of technology’ 
externality has to do with the fact that, due to path dependency, the 
distribution of investments over different technology clusters may be sub-
optimal from a social welfare point of view. Finally, the environmental 
externality arises from the fact that there is no proper market for the 
environment. It is important to distinguish these three types of externalities, 
as only taking away the environmental externality does not imply that 
situations of lock-in will no longer occur. In Section 5 we will look at 
government policies with respect to the different types of externalities, and 
discuss the question of how government intervention may induce an escape 
from an undesired situation of lock-in.  
We complete this section by looking at an example of technological lock-
in. One of the most discussed and pressing examples of technological lock-in 
is the lock-in of industrial economies into fossil fuel-based technological 
systems. Despite the availability of carbon-saving technologies that have 
environmental and economic advantages, carbon-based energy technologies 
are still being widely applied. There appear to be barriers to the diffusion 
and adoption of the alternative carbon-saving technologies. These barriers 
can, at the micro-level, be explained by myopic micro-economic decision-
making. Above that, at the macro-level there are forces that create systematic 
barriers to the adoption of carbon-saving technologies. These forces can be 
understood in terms of path-dependence, which comes about as a result of 
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positive feedbacks into the economy (increasing returns). As a consequence, 
dominant designs are continuously being refined and firms incrementally 
develop their know-how. Examples of inferior technologies becoming 
locked-in as dominant designs are the QWERTY keyboard and the VHS 
video tape technology. 
5. TRANSITIONS AND GOVERNMENT 
INTERVENTION 
In principle, neo-classical economics describes technology transitions as 
processes of gradual technical progress, which is the eventual result of 
rational behaviour. Three consecutive steps can be distinguished when 
entrepreneurs make investment decisions in technological development. The 
first choice is to decide what part of the available factor inputs, labour in 
particular, is utilised for actual production, and what part is assigned to 
investments in R&D that leads to increases in technology capital through the 
design and implementation of a more efficient production technology. 
Important in this decision is the trade-off between foregone production now, 
when investing in the development of a new technology, and expected future 
increases in production, when the newly developed technology becomes 
operational. The second decision is about the type of these investments in 
R&D. Here the entrepreneur has to decide about the bias of technical 
progress. Should research be directed at the development of a more energy-
saving technical progress, or will the focus be on enhancing the efficiency of 
labour in production? This choice determines the type of vintages that can be 
installed in future. The third decision relates to new capital investments, 
namely whether new vintages are installed to improve on existing 
technologies or whether the new capital investments use a new technology. 
The latter case would represent the start of a technological transition. 
According to neo-classical economics, relative prices and expectations about 
relative prices, uncertainty, and the costs of learning processes are the main 
determinants of decisions on these three choices.  
As noted in Section 3, government policy will interfere with these 
choices in so far as the policy aims at correcting market failures. We have 
seen that environmental policy relates to negative externalities in the use of 
energy in production, and technology policy relates to positive externalities 
because of spillovers in the design and adoption of technology capital. Both 
types of policies may, through the mechanisms described above, contribute 
to technological transitions. However, neo-classical theory does not leave 
much scope for additional transition management by the government. In fact, 




reasons to do so. An essential prerequisite for transition management is that 
production in a broad sense has to be trapped in a technological lock-in, 
which, from a long-run perspective is considered unfavourable. In other 
words: for transition management to be successful it is necessary to know 
both the reasons that have caused technological lock-in (see the previous 
section) and to have a clear indication that the lock-in is socially sub optimal 
in the long-run. These are harsh conditions that limit the scope of transition 
management much more than the broad concept in the national 
environmental policy plan (NMP4, 2001), and in the proposals for transition 
management following this plan (see e.g. Aubert et al., 2001, RMNO, 2003). 
From the neo-classical perspective the rules for policy intervention are also 
stricter than suggested by evolutionary economics (see also chapter by van 
den Bergh et al., in this book). 
A major question when the government considers intervention in a 
dominant technology is whether there are alternative technologies that, for 
some reason, did not succeed in becoming dominant. It seems that the 
government should be very cautious in promoting the transition to such 
existing alternatives. An example is the promotion of public transport at the 
cost of private transport. Apparently both technologies co-exist and there is 
no reason, other than internalising the negative externalities of private 
transport, for the government to favour a shift to public transport. Both 
technologies co-exist because they are imperfect substitutes and even, to 
some extent, complementary to each other. 
From the neo-classical perspective, a reason for additional government 
intervention in promoting technological change can be that initiating the 
development of a complete new technology is very costly because, at that 
early stage, it is very uncertain whether it will become the dominant single 
technology where the investment costs are earned back. In fact, it is the 
imperfect working of the capital market that provides a reason for such 
government intervention. Here the role of transition management is to 
facilitate the development of new technologies in niches where they are, in 
an initial period, protected from harsh competition. Yet, after this period of 
variation facilitated by the government comes a period of selection. The 
scope for the government to interfere in this selection process is very limited. 
The government, by no means has a lead in information on which of the 
alternative new technologies will yield the highest social welfare in a 
technological transition. Therefore, the government should not try to pick 
winners. The government, however, may interfere when letting the market 
do its work seems to lead to a suboptimal technology (but, again, who 
decides what is suboptimal?). Government intervention may also be needed 
when, due to network externalities, the economy gets trapped in an 
unwarranted lock-in of a technological monopoly, or, on the contrary, in a 
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technology split that is socially suboptimal because network externalities are 
not fully exploited. An example of the latter is the simultaneous introduction 
of the ‘chipper’ and the ‘chipknip’ as two competing forms of plastic money 
by two bank consortia in The Netherlands. During the co-existence of both 
technologies, hardly any transition took place to this new payment 
technology.  
All in all, from the neo-classical perspective it seems that the traditional 
policy instruments of environmental policy and of technology policy still 
constitute the basic tools in transition management. Yet when there is a clear 
indication that an escape from an existing technology is needed, it can be 
important to put the existing system under pressure by means of levies and 
regulation. This makes the old system more expensive and enhances the 
incentives for the development of, and the transition to, a new system. Such 
transition policy requires both a solid knowledge of the reasons for the lock-
in and of the market failures that prevent adoption of a new technology in a 
socially optimal way. However, unlike evolutionary economics, no further 
policy prescriptions can be given to the shape and timing of stimulating 
transition trajectories. Moreover, there is another reason why the policy of 
making the old system more expensive is to be preferred to a policy of general 
subsidies for the development of new technologies. Subsidies may cause 
early adoption of a new technology, whereas, with the benefit of hindsight, it 
would have been better to wait and adopt a more efficient technology later. 
As a matter of fact, general subsidies for development and adoption of new 
technologies (or to improve on existing technologies) bring about high 
‘deadweight’ losses, i.e. a large number of entrepreneurs would have 
developed or adopted the new technology without subsidies. 
6. TRANSITION TO WIND ENERGY: 
AN EXAMPLE 
An obvious way to achieve more sustainable use of energy would be a 
transition from fossil fuel-based production methods to wind as a means of 
energy production. Although the use of wind as a source of energy has a 
long tradition, the technology of large-scale production of electricity by 
means of wind turbines has only recently gathered (new) momentum. 
Development of wind turbine technology is ongoing, especially with respect 
to electricity production, and various routes are still open. Wind turbine 
technology can thus be regarded as an example of technological transition at 
an early stage, where various alternative technologies still co-exist and the 
selection of a dominant technology has not yet taken place. In principle, two 
different roads are open for the adoption of wind technology: namely, 
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production by relatively small windmills on the premises of individuals, 
farmers, in most cases, and on a larger scale in windmill parks owned by 
major electricity-producing companies. 
Klaassen et al. (2003) report on how government policy, with respect to 
subsidising the development of wind turbine technology and the adoption of 
that technology, has been different in Denmark, Germany and the United 
Kingdom. Differences in policy have resulted in different outcomes with 
respect to the extent of wind energy production in these countries; so the 
case can be seen as a kind of natural experiment in transition management, 
although neo-classical economists would look at it from a different 
perspective, seeing it as a lesson in what incentives government can use to 
promote the development and adoption of a new technology. Learning 
curves and their exploitation play a major role in the design of government 
policy to speed up a warranted technological transition. 
The Danish policy to promote the development and use of wind turbines 
for electricity production has been most successful. Klaassen et al. (2003) 
conclude that in Denmark, R&D as well as demonstration projects, in 
conjunction with investment subsidies, favoured the development of reliable 
small wind turbines. In that country, the careful balance and timing of R&D 
and procurement support have been important to promote both innovation and 
diffusion of wind energy. Denmark started to promote wind energy in the 
mid 1970s. In 1991, wind turbines provided around 3% of Danish electricity 
consumption. It appears that the success of the Danish policy can be ascribed 
both to an early start in promoting these developments (‘first movers’ 
advantage’) and to good insights into the learning processes so that the 
adoption of reliable windmills by farmers on a small scale was favoured. The 
European Commission (1997) reported another aspect that may have 
contributed to this Danish success: the first large market for the modern 
wind industry was California, USA, in the early 1980s. The growth of this 
market, a good example of an early niche for a new technology, stimulated 
the development of wind technology in many other countries. In the years 
from 1986-1990, the market in California declined, causing major financial 
difficulties in the wind industry. Many companies went bankrupt, but the 
simple Danish, 3-bladed stall-regulated design survived and was even up-
scaled to provide more cost-effective units. This early selection process thus 
favoured Danish windmill technology.  
By contrast, German R&D programs that started also in the 1970s, but 
aimed at developing large-scale wind energy production, failed. Yet the 
development of small wind turbines, where various subsidies provided an 
incentive for product and process innovation, has been rather successful in 
Germany, although overlapping subsidies might have resulted in efficiency 
losses. Moreover, due to knowledge spillovers, small German windmill 
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manufacturers were able to benefit from Danish expertise. According to 
Klaassen et al., the UK has been least successful in promoting wind energy. 
Here, support for renewable energy only started in 1989 with the passing of 
the electricity Act. R&D expenditures were insufficiently geared towards the 
type of turbines being installed. The UK subsidy scheme thus contributed to 
driving down the costs but not much capacity has been installed. 
The example of wind energy shows that, with the benefit of hindsight, 
part of the developments can be explained by means of neo-classical 
economic theory. It is documented how price incentives (through various 
types of subsidies) influenced the adoption of new technologies, and how 
learning curves played a crucial role. Yet more sophisticated neo-classical 
models should be developed to explain more of the transition to wind 
energy. More attention should be paid to the total adoption costs of the 
alternative new technologies. These consist not only of learning costs and 
investment costs, but depend also on the societal preferences and acceptance 
with respect to the various types of windmills. It appears that large-scale 
windmill parks may bring about more societal costs than small windmills 
used by individual farmers, due to the impact on the landscape. However, 
such preferences may eventually change. Environmental valuation methods 
could give more insights into these indirect societal costs.  
7. CONCLUSION 
Neo-classical economics has a long-standing tradition with describing 
processes of technological change. This perspective is very much related to 
what environmental policy-makers nowadays call ‘technological transitions.’ 
Therefore, neo-classical economics offers an excellent methodological 
framework for the design and evaluation of policy prescriptions with respect 
to technological transitions and transition management. The arguments are 
based on formal models of production processes where, through the market 
economy, price incentives lead to the development, adoption and use of 
socially optimal production technologies. Changes in preferences, e.g. 
towards a higher weighting of the environment in the welfare function, result 
in changes in price incentives which promote the gradual adaptation of 
existing equipment to the technology which is optimal under the new 
preferences. Ideally, in their R&D investments, entrepreneurs anticipate 
these preference changes so that producers can avail themselves of the new 
technologies in due course.  
In this formal neo-classical theory, the role of the government is limited. 
Government intervention is needed in the case of market failures, i.e. when 
rational behaviour of individual consumers and producers does not lead to a 
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socially optimal outcome. In most cases (positive and negative) externalities 
will be the reason for market failure. The appropriate policy is to correct 
these market failures by internalising the externalities. There are various 
ways to do so, but from the neo-classical economics perspective it is 
essential that government intervention should be based on an extensive 
analysis of the types of market failures. Here the favoured choice of 
government intervention is through prices. Yet when the markets do not 
work perfectly, e.g. the capital market fails to finance highly risky R&D 
investments in new technologies, other types of government intervention 
may be justified.  
To justify such government intervention, policy-makers should always 
see to it that the benefits of repairing market failures outweigh the costs of 
government intervention. Therefore, the government should be very cautious 
when conducting transition management that goes beyond traditional 
environmental policy to correct the negative environmental externalities, as 
well as traditional technology policy, which copes with positive externalities 
caused by knowledge spillovers in R&D and new technology adoption. 
Here, it appears that for the promotion of technological change, more 
emphasis is needed on adoption as compared with technological innovation 
(see e.g. Mulder, 2003). 
When there is general consensus that an escape from a technological 
lock-in is needed and that only a fundamental system innovation can resolve 
a ‘wicked’ environmental problem, a solid analysis should be made of the 
causes of the lock-in. These causes relate to the path dependence and the 
increasing returns with respect to adoption and use of dominant 
technologies, such as the fossil fuel-based technological systems of 
industrial economies. In that case, it is the subtle interaction between the 
design of new technologies and the learning processes with respect to 
implementing these new technologies about which the government should collect 
information in order to facilitate the escape from a technological lock-in.  
In sum, in the neo-classical view of industrial transformation and 
transition management, the emphasis is on the co-ordination between 
environmental and technology policy, where the government should reckon 
that diversification of new technologies can be hindered by capital market 
imperfections and that societal costs with respect to environmental 
preferences can play a major role in the adoption of new technologies. The 
scope of transition management is limited, however, in the sense that final 
decisions about the development and adoption of new technologies should 
be left to entrepreneurs. 
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